


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Description of Module

Paper Name	Logic -II
Subject Name	Philosophy
Module Name/ Title	The Logical Structure of the Jaina Doctrine of Syādvāda
Module Id	7.37
Prerequisites	General understanding of Jaina philosophy
Objectives	To study Syādvāda as a logical doctrine
Key words	<i>Anekāntavāda, syādvāda, kathañcit, saptabhaṅgī, avaktavyam</i>



The Logical Structure of the Jaina Doctrine of Syādvāda

1. Introduction

Anekāntavāda, a doctrine of Non-absolutism or that of Non-dogmatism can be described as a central philosophy of Jainism. Jainism as a religion centers around the principle of Non-violence (i.e. Ahimsā), and as a philosophical system, it can be regarded as identical with Anekāntavāda. The two, viz. Ahimsā and Anekāntavāda are closely related to one another, in that the latter is conceived as the non-violence extended to the intellectual domain.¹ This description is equally applicable to the doctrine of Syādvāda as it presents the idea of relativity of judgments. Hence, it would be helpful to see the interrelation between Anekāntavāda, Syādvāda and one more theory, viz. Nayavāda as expounded by Jainism.

Anekāntavāda is a theory of manifoldness of reality and truth. As a philosophical system, Jainism mediates between philosophy of permanence represented by Vedānta on the one hand and philosophy of change represented by Buddhism on the other. According to Jainism, both the views, viz. one advocating permanence and the other advocating change, if accepted exclusively, do not represent the reality authentically because reality is manifold. Therefore, it must be accepted that reality possesses both features, viz., permanence and change. Thus, asserting that reality is permanent as well as changing, without becoming dogmatic about those features, is to accept Anekāntavāda. Jainas in their thought also try to resolve other pairs of opposites such as existence and non-existence, one and many, identical and different.

It is aptly described by the modern scholars that ‘as a philosophical methodology, Anekāntavāda takes its flight, on the two wings of Nayavāda and Syādvāda-sapthabhaṅgī.’²

It is obvious that reality would be described as either permanent or changing or both, similarly, existent, non-existent or both and so on. The types to observe and demonstrate reality by emphasizing its one feature without taking into consideration the others are called Nayas (lit. standpoints) in Jainism. Anekāntavāda presupposes Nayavāda, i.e. theory of stand points. Nayavāda will be discussed separately in a separate module. (Logic II-Module 38). In the present module, we are going to concentrate on Syādvāda.

As expressed by Samantabhadra,³ the Jainas propose to show how different pairs of apparently contradictory characters can be attributed to any entity without involving self-contradiction and also as a logical requirement of any assertion. Alternately, Syādvāda proposes to bring to light that diverse descriptions of reality offered by different philosophical systems contain partial truth as they have been made in some particular context. Reality will be comprehended in entirety if and when all the possible conditional predications are considered. Thus, the emphasis of Syādvāda is to highlight the partiality and conditionality of the assertions about anything.

If the reality is asserted as both permanent and changing, existent and non-existent, one and many and so on, there arises the situation of contradictory assertions and the problem of resolving the contradiction. It is interesting to see how Syādvāda overcomes this problem. One can say, for instance, that this problem is overcome by Syādvāda by treating any assertion about reality (made by applying the prefix ‘syāt’) as a conditional assertion. Or that the Jainas are not sticking to two-valued logic, but by introducing ‘indescribable’ as the third value, they are introducing a three-valued logic. Or that Jainas imply that an assertion holds true only in a particular context and not in any other context. This has led

¹Matilal, (1) p.04

²Padmarajiah, p.273

³ The Jaina logician in 5th C. A.D., the author of *Āptamīmāṃsā*

modern scholars to present different interpretations of Syādvāda. Before we review such attempts, let us try to understand the nature of Syādvāda, as it has been explored traditionally.

2. Syādvāda- the Jaina Dialectic

The spirit of reconciliation between two extreme ends and that of toleration flows as the undercurrent of Jaina philosophy right from the pre-canonical period and gets crystallized in canonical and further writings. Syādvāda is not an exception to this. At some places, the terms Anekāntavāda and Syādvāda have been used interchangeably. Syādvāda is often mentioned by the dual name Syādvāda-Saptabhaṅgī. Here, Syādvāda represents the doctrine of conditional assertion and Saptabhaṅgi represents the sevenfold structure of the conditional assertions.

A systematic presentation of Syādvāda is found in the text titled *Āptamīmāṃsā*, written by the Jaina logician Samantabhadra in 5th C.A.D. In verses 14 and 16 of Section I, Samantabhadra gives a proper articulation of Syādvāda-Saptabhaṅgī as follows-

Kathañcittesadeveṣṭamkathañcidasadeva tat |

Tathobhayamavācyam ca nayayogānnasarvathā || 14 ||

“An entity is somehow possessed of the character ‘being’, somehow possessed of the character ‘non-being’, somehow possessed of both ‘being and non-being’, while it is somehow indescribable- all these four features characterising it in accordance with the speaker’s intention (alternatively, in accordance with the conditions of assertion), not in absolute manner.”

Kramārpitadvayāddvaitamsahāvācyamaśaktitaḥ |

Avaktavyottarāḥṣeṣāstrayobhaṅgāḥsvahetutaḥ || 16||

“An entity is possessed of the characters ‘being’ as well as ‘non-being’ insofar as these are possessed to be asserted successively, while it is indescribable insofar as they are proposed to be asserted simultaneously- this latter being an impossible proposition. Lastly, three more forms of assertion-each made possible by its specific circumstances- arise when an entity is held out to be possessed of the character ‘being’ as also to be indescribable, when it is held out to be possessed of the character ‘non-being’ as also to be indescribable, when it is held out to be possessed of the characters ‘being’ as well as ‘non-being’ as also to be indescribable.”

3. Sevenfold judgment

On the basis of Samantabhadra’s exposition, following seven-fold judgment regarding the nature of any reality was established in the Jaina tradition-

1. *Syādasti*- Somehow, a thing exists.
2. *Syādnāsti*- Somehow, a thing does not exist
3. *Syādasti ca nāsti ca*- Somehow, a thing exists and does not exist
4. *Syādavaktavyam*- Somehow, a thing is indescribable
5. *Syādasti ca avaktavyam ca*- Somehow, a thing exists and is indescribable
6. *Syādnāsti ca avaktavyam ca*- Somehow, a thing does not exist and is indescribable
7. *Syādasti ca nāsti ca avaktavyam ca*- Somehow, a thing exists, does not exist and is indescribable.

Here we have translated *syāt* as ‘somehow’ (the Sanskrit word: *kathañcit*) which can be taken to mean, ‘conditionally’. Thus, these seven assertions turn out to be conditional assertions about anything.

4. Meaning of the word 'Syāt'

In verses 103 and 104 of *Āptamīmāṃsā*, Samantabhadra comments upon 'syāt' and 'syādvāda' as follows-

“The word 'syāt' prefacing a sentence is grammatically a *nipāta* (i.e. a particle) and it, by indicating that the state of affairs sought to be described by the sentence concerned has numerous aspects, qualities, shows (in a particular fashion) the purport of this sentence.....Syādvāda consists in making conditional (i.e. non-absolutistic) assertions concerning these or those aspects of a situation and this by utterly giving up absolutism of all sorts.”

To express it in different words, the word 'syāt' indicates the context in which a sentence is made. According to Jainism, any empirical phenomenon can be understood in terms of four conditions, viz. *dravya*, *kṣetra*, *kāla* and *bhāva*, i.e. root-substance, space, time and manifesting form respectively. Any phenomenon or object can be asserted to in the context of particular *dravya-kṣetra-kāla-bhāva* and can be denied in the context of another *dravya-kṣetra-kāla-bhāva*. (This will be discussed in more detail in the forthcoming section). 'Syāt' highlights that context and Syādvāda represents seven contextual predications. Each contextual predication is called a '*bhaṅga*'.

5. Elaboration of each Bhaṅga

Now, these *bhaṅgas*, especially the first four, need explanation.

1. *Syādasti*: Any empirical phenomenon or thing can be asserted in the context of a particular root substance manifesting a particular form at a particular place and a particular time. To use an oft-quoted example, a pot exists in the context of a particular root substance, space, time and form. About a given pot we can say that the pot exists (as an earthen pot). Or if *sva-dravya* is interpreted as the thing itself and *para-dravya* as some other thing, then 'the pot exists from the *sva-dravya* point of view' means the pot exists as pot. It exists here, it exists now, and it exists as having a round shape.
2. *Syādnāsti*: Any empirical phenomenon or thing can be denied in the context of another root substance, space, time and form. A pot 'does not exist' as a wooden pot (or if *para-dravya* means some other thing, then 'the pot is non-existent from the *para-dravya* point of view' means 'the pot does not exist as some other thing, say as a cat), it does not exist at some other place, at some other time, as having square shape etc.
3. *Syādasti ca nāsti ca*: Any empirical phenomenon or a thing can be asserted in the context of a particular root substance, space, time and manifesting form, while the same can be denied in the context of another particular root substance, space, time and manifesting form. 'A pot exists as an earthen pot and does not exist as a wooden pot'; 'It exists here and not there' etc. This happens when we apply the two contexts- *sva-dravya* and *para-dravya*- in succession.
4. *Syādavaktavyam ca*: Any empirical phenomenon or a thing can be described as 'indescribable/inexpressible' when it is impossible to describe it as both 'exists' and 'does not exist'. This happens when we try to apply both the contexts-such as *sva-dravya* and *para-dravya*, simultaneously. So in a particular context, (that is, in simultaneous application of two contexts) a pot is inexpressible.
5. *Syādasti ca avaktavyam ca*: An empirical phenomenon or a thing exists only in the context of a particular root substance, space, time and manifesting form, and is inexpressible. Thus, in a certain context, pot exists and is inexpressible. This is the combination of 1 and 4.
6. *Syādnāsti ca avaktavyam ca*: An empirical phenomenon or a thing does not exist in the context of a particular root substance, space, time and manifesting form and is inexpressible. Thus, a pot does not exist as a cat and is inexpressible. This is the combination of 2 and 4.

7. *Syadasti ca nāsti ca avaktavyam ca*: An empirical phenomenon or a thing exists in a particular context, does not exist in another particular context and is inexpressible. Thus a pot exists as a pot, does not exist as a cat and is inexpressible. This is the combination of 1, 2 and 4.

According to the Jainas there can be exactly seven conditional assertions about any phenomenon or a thing, neither more nor less.

6. Features of *Syādvāda-Saptabhaṅgī*

Some points can be noted about this seven-fold predication:

- ❖ The ascriptions 'being' and not-being' are not applied by the Jaina logicians in a univocal manner. That is, the Jaina logicians do not describe any phenomenon or a thing as 'does not exist' in the same way or a sense in which it is described as 'exists'. It can be said that 'A pot exists' in a particular context, in the context of its own substance, space, time and manifesting form. Ordinarily, when this context is absent, it is said that 'A pot does not exist'. But in *Saptabhaṅgī*, it is shown that one can say 'A pot does not exist' even if one perceives a pot, because one's statement 'a pot does not exist' is not denying the existence of a pot as a pot, it is indicating that a pot does not exist as a cat (rather, any non-pot object). Thus, '*syādasti*' indicates an existential context while '*syātnāsti*' indicates a conceptual context. And neither of these statements is made in an absolutistic manner. It is made explicit by the use of the particle '*syāt*'. It is very much essential to understand the meaning of the Jaina ascriptions '*asti*' and '*nāsti*' failing which the entire theory of Syādvāda can be wrongly understood as the doctrine of 'anything is permissible'.
- ❖ The conceptual context of '*syātnāsti*' is derived from the four-fold articulation of the concept of 'non-existence' (*abhāva*).⁴ Four kinds of non-existence are conceived by Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers as follows⁵- i. Prior non-existence (*prāgabhāva*), ii. Posterior non-existence (*pradhvaṁsābhāva*), iii. Mutual non-existence (*anyonyābhāva*), and iv. To reside in improper locus (*atyantābhāva*). The conditional assertion of the type '*syātnāsti*' is possible because there is a conception of mutual non-existence according to which, every entity excludes every other entity, and in turn, every entity can be asserted to be non-existent insofar as all other entities are concerned.
- ❖ The seven-fold predication of reality is a corollary of the Jaina metaphysical position. According to the Jainas, reality is multi-faceted. Hence, every facet of reality will be asserted only conditionally, and all the conditional assertions taken together will give a complete picture of reality. Moreover, the number of assertions will not be less than and not more than seven (as shown above). Thus, *Syādvāda-Saptabhaṅgī* reciprocates Jaina metaphysical position; and it can be called metaphysical dialectic.

7. Modern-logical Interpretations

Need for an alternative logical system?

The sevenfold predication of any entity, described earlier, becomes unique because of the use of the word '*syāt*'. That is also the reason for ascribing it as Syādvāda. In the original verses, the word '*kathañcī*' appears which has later taken the form '*syāt*'. In ordinary Sanskrit, '*syāt*' is used in the sense of 'perhaps', or 'maybe'. However, the Jaina logicians are sure that they are not propounding the doctrine of either perhaps-ism or probability. They are crystallizing the Anekānta doctrine, which represents neither doubt nor uncertainty but non-absolutism, through Syādvāda. And to indicate this, they have

⁴*Āptamīmāṃs*, Section 1, verse 10

⁵ The idea of four kinds of non-existence is first articulated in Nyaya system. Samantabhadra seems to have borrowed it from the Nyaya texts.

advocated a stipulated meaning of the word 'syāt'. The logical system developed through Syādvāda, unlike the traditional logical system, does not assume universal truth or universal falsity of any statements. Hence, the presuppositions as well as derivatives of the system of Syādvāda are likely to be different from those of the traditional logical system.

Does Sādvāda challenge the basic laws of thought?

A system of Logic generally accepts three principles (as expounded in the Aristotelian logic), viz. principle of identity, principle of non-contradiction and principle of excluded middle. Irrespective of whether a system belongs to Indian or Western tradition, or given the limitations of either one or many of them, these three principles operate as the governing principles for any logical system. It is true that the construction or formulation of these principles takes different forms in two traditions.⁶

Syādvāda, as elaborated in previous sections, apparently challenges these basic principles of logic, particularly those of excluded middle and non-contradiction. If we suppress the role of the prefix 'syāt' and concentrate on the *bhaṅgas* 3 and 4, we get the following picture:

- 1) In *bhaṅga* 4, namely 'avaktavyam' (indescribable/inexpressible), both the possibilities, namely 'the pot exists' and 'the pot does not exist' are excluded. This apparently violates the law of excluded middle.
- 2) In *bhaṅga* 3, both the possibilities are asserted together. This apparently violates the law of non-contradiction.

This has led some scholars to interpret the logical structure of *syādvāda* as a form of 'deviant logic' or 'many-valued logic'⁷. For example, Sangamlal Pande did so in one of his papers⁸. Similarly BK Matilal suggests that according to the Jainas the same statement under different interpretations can be 'true', 'false', 'both true and false', 'not decidable as either true or false' and so on; and formulates a seven-valued logic⁹. But scholars like T K Sarkar¹⁰ and Pradeep Gokhale¹¹ have criticized the move which questions the basic laws of thought because it does not take into account the role of the prefix *syāt*.

8. Syādvāda as Multi-valued logic

Here, a question can be raised as to whether the logic of Syādvāda can be developed as Multi-valued logic. If Syādvāda is to be called multi-valued logic, there requires a small variation in the structure of Saptabhaṅgī. Existence (*asti*), non-existence (*nāsti*) and inexpressibility (*avaktavyam*) may be treated as three fundamental values and the mathematical combinations out of them may lead to further

⁶See 'Logic in Earliest Classical India', ed. by Brendan Gillon. Pp 7-9

⁷For a detailed account of many-valued logics, see Nicholas Rescher, *Many-Valued Logic* McGraw-Hill, New York, 1963

⁸"Nayavāda and Many-valued Logic" as Included in M.P. Marathe, Meena Kelkar, P.P. Gokhale (eds.), *Studies in Jainism*, Indian Philosophical Quarterly Publication, Pune, 1984

⁹Matilal, B. K. , "The Jaina Contribution to Logic", as included in *The Character of Logic in India*, pp.136-139

¹⁰Sarkar, T.K. 'Reconstruction of Jaina Philosophy' as included in Sarkar, Priyambada. D. K. Mohanto., S.R. Bhattacharyya., & Uma Chattopadhyay [Eds.] (2009): *Studies in Epistemology: Indian Perspectives*. University of Calcutta in collaboration with RADIANCE.

¹¹"The Logical Structure of *Syādvāda*", *Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research*, Vol. VIII, No. 3, May-August 1991

four compound assertions. To the binary value system of assertion and denial adopted in the logical discourse, Syādvāda may contribute the third primary value of inexpressibility and then formulate further derivations. Here, however, a question can be asked about 'avaktavya' as the alleged third truth value whether it expresses a logical gap between truth and falsehood or an epistemic gap between our abilities to determine the statement to be true and false. The category of *avaktavya* does not seem to emerge simply because two contradictory statements happen to be made simultaneously (*yugapat*), but rather because the two standpoints from which the two apparently contradictory statements are asserted are considered at once and not sequentially. It is, for instance, odd to consider whether 'pot' exists as 'pot' and at the same time as a 'cloth'. The oddity involved is more of an epistemological kind than logical. The middle value designated by the term *avaktavya* is therefore better understood as the epistemic middle rather than as the logical middle. As a result we can say that *avaktavya* is not the third truth-value in the logical sense of the term, because it does not arise out of the violation of the laws of logic such as non-contradiction and excluded middle.

9. Two Modern Formulations

Some scholars have attempted to formulate *Syādvāda-saptabhaṅgī* within the framework of classical two-valued logic. Two such attempts are worth-noticing here;

- 1) **Syāt-statement as a conditional statement:** Sagarmal Jain¹² and BK Matilal¹³ in their papers have independently interpreted *syādvāda* in terms of conditional propositions. The essence of the view of both Matilal and Jain is that the proposition of the form *syātghatahasti* could be expressed as a conditional statement in which the statement 'the pot exists' is the consequent and the standpoint from which the consequent is asserted is expressed by the antecedent. Jain has even formulated a complete version of *saptabhaṅgī* in terms of conditional statements as given below:

- i) $C1 \supset (S \text{ is } P)$
- ii) $C2 \supset (S \text{ is not } P)$
- iii) $[C1 \supset (S \text{ is } P)]. [C2 \supset (S \text{ is not } P)]$
- iv) $(C1.C2) \supset (S \text{ is inexpressible})$
- v) $[C1 \supset (S \text{ is } P)]. [(C1.C2) \supset (S \text{ is inexpressible})]$
- vi) $[C2 \supset (S \text{ is not } P)]. [(C1.C2) \supset (S \text{ is inexpressible})]$
- vii) $[C1 \supset (S \text{ is } P)]. [C2 \supset (S \text{ is not } P)]. [(C1.C2) \supset (S \text{ is inexpressible})]$

Here C1 refers to the condition such as *sv-dravya* point of view; C2 refers to the condition such as *para-dravya* point of view, and 'C1.C2' refers to simultaneous application of the conditions C1 and C2.

- 2) **Syātas an existential Quantifier:** Pradeep Gokhale in his paper "Logical Structure of Syādvāda"¹⁴ has interpreted the term *Syāt* ('in a sense', 'in a way') as 'there is a way in which' or 'there is a stand-point from which' that is, as an existential quantifier. He proceeds to formulate the *Syādvāda-saptabhaṅgī* on the following lines;

Given that $S_x = x$ is a standpoint; $xTy = 'x \text{ makes } y \text{ true}'$ and $p =$ the statement 'The pot exists', then according to Gokhale the first *bhaṅga* may be formulated as:

¹²Jain, Sagarmal: '*Syādvāda : EkaCintana*' (Hindi), included in M.P. Marathe, MeenaKelkar, P.P. Gokhale (eds.), *Studies in Jainism*, Indian Philosophical Quarterly Publication, Pune, 1984

¹³Matilal. B. K.(2): '*Saptabhaṅgī*' included in J.N. Mohanty and S.P. Banerjee (ed.), *Self, Knowledge and Freedom*, The World Press, Calcutta, 1978

¹⁴*Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research*, Vol. VIII, No. 3, May-August 1991

$(\exists x) (Sx. xTp)$

This can be read as,

There is a stand-point from which the statement p is true.

Now given that ' $\sim p$ '= 'It is not the case that p' and ' ∞p '= 'It is undeterminable whether p' the seven-fold scheme of *syādvāda* can be represented according to Gokhale as follows:

- (1) $(\exists x) (Sx. xTp)$
- (2) $(\exists x) (Sx. xT\sim p)$
- (3) $(\exists x) (Sx. xTp). (\exists y) (Sy. yT\sim p)$
- (4) $(\exists x) (Sx. xT\infty p)$
- (5) $(\exists x) (Sx. xTp). (\exists y) (Sy. yT\infty p)$
- (6) $(\exists x) (Sx. xT\sim p). (\exists y) (Sy. yT\infty p)$
- (7) $(\exists x) (Sx. xTp). (\exists y) (Sy. yT\sim p). (\exists z) (Sz. zT\infty p)$

10. Critical Appraisal of Syādvāda

i. Traditional and Contemporary objections:

As mentioned by the Jaina and the non-Jaina scholars, there are the following faults as shown to be present in the doctrine of Syādvāda¹⁵- 1) *virodha* (contradiction), 2) *saṁśaya* (doubt), 3) *saṅkara* (intermixture), 4) *vaiyadhikaraṇya* (lack of conformity of bases), 5) *anavasthā* (infinite regress), 6) *abhāva* (absence), 7) *vyatikara* (cross-breeding), 8) *aprapatti* (lack of comprehension).

Majority of these faults can be seen as the minor variations of the three major defects, viz. intermixture (*saṅkara*), dubiety (*saṁśaya*) and contradiction (*virodha*). And even out of the three, the fault of contradiction (*virodha*) is the most serious one.

- ❖ If Syādvāda is accepted, a liberated person will not be really liberated.¹⁶ For, from one point of view, he will be considered non-liberated, from another point of view, as both liberated and non-liberated. And there will be no 'final' claim about the liberation of a person.
- ❖ If the statement 'every assertion is conditional' is taken to be an unconditional assertion, then it involves self-contradiction and it falsifies the very doctrine of Syādvāda. For, according to Syādvāda, any assertion is conditional. But if this assertion is regarded as unconditional, then there would be at least one assertion which is unconditional, and it refutes Syādvāda. To overcome this, if the above assertion is treated as conditional, then it would mean that from a particular standpoint every assertion is conditional, from another standpoint, no assertion is conditional and so on. This refutes the very purpose of Syādvāda and puts it into a paradoxical situation.
- ❖ Syadvada is criticized for conjoining two opposites (viz. *asti* and *nāsti*) into one assertion and hence, condemned to be involving intermixture/ cross-breeding.
- ❖ A very common objection against the *Saptabhaṅgī* has been that the number of conditional predications can go upto a hundred or a thousand, why is it restricted to only seven?¹⁷

These objections can be and have been responded to and it has been shown that they cannot be detrimental to Syādvāda; rather they really do not hit the point.

¹⁵Different thinkers mention different criticisms according to some priorities. Here is a list that accommodates all the objections.

¹⁶Vyomsīva's objection, elaborated in Matilal, (1) p. 57

¹⁷Kumārila's objection stated in Ślokavārtika, translated by Matilal, (1) p.56.

About the exact number of conditional predications, it has been argued that there may be an infinite number of properties that can be ascribed to any object. Anekāntavāda appreciates such ascription. But the Saptabhaṅgī will be applicable to each of those properties. So long as the Jaina logicians accept only three basic values, there will be seven and only seven possible formulations.

The criticism of putting opposite predicates together is applicable mainly to the first three predications in the traditional Saptabhaṅgī. However, as elaborated previously, the predications '*syādasti*' and '*syātnāsti*' cannot be treated as opposites but the assertions made from two different perspectives, and hence, do not lead to any logical contradictions.

The Jainas can always defend their doctrine by arguing that by applying two 'apparently contradictory' properties to some object, one doesn't commit self-contradiction. There always remains the possibility that one can explain some hidden meaning of one's assertion to resolve the 'apparent' self-contradiction.

The criticism bringing out the paradox can be replied to by constructing an argument that Syādvāda is not applicable to itself because Syādvāda is not an ordinary assertion, it serves a different purpose. Here, it will be worth mentioning the doctrine of 'emptiness' propounded by Nāgārjuna, the Buddhist thinker, and also 'verification principle' advocated by the Logical Positivists. Those doctrines were defended by arguing that they have therapeutic value, a regulative function, and that they should not be treated as constituting the objects of the doctrines themselves.

On similar lines, the Jaina logicians can argue that Syādvāda does not represent a metaphysical position of the Jainas but it is a 'meta-philosophical' doctrine. It functions as a regulative, or rather evaluative principle for all the metaphysical assertions made by different systems of philosophy.

This last argument of the Jainas can be appreciated with some reservations. If Syādvāda is treated as a meta-philosophical doctrine, then it will be applicable not only to Non-Jaina metaphysical systems, but also to the Jaina metaphysics. For example, it will be applicable to the metaphysical assertions such as 'There are six substances (*dravyas*)' or 'Soul is middle-sized' etc. We will have to say on the background of Syādvāda, that these metaphysical assertions made by the Jainas are partially and conditionally true. Will the Jaina thinkers accept this? Jaina thinkers will have to address this million-dollar question in order to rule out the charge of being paradoxical and self-refuting.

11. Contribution of Syadvada

Despite these conjectures and refutations, significance of Syādvāda and its contribution to logic cannot be undermined. With all its limitations, Syādvāda offers a balanced and rational approach to the age-old controversies reflected in diverse philosophical, metaphysical theories. It brings to light in a very convincing manner that every system asserts its position without really understanding a position asserted by the 'so-called' rival systems; that every perspective about reality contains the truth provided it is properly qualified and conditionalized; that adding a '*syāt*' prefix to any assertion about reality is a way to understand reality in a better, profound and non-violent manner.

In addition to this, Syādvāda offers a substantive contribution to 'Logic' per se. It opens up the possibility of building a new logical system using the method provided by it. This is a good opportunity for students of logic to compare, contrast or synthesize the logic of Syādvāda with traditional logic and go forward towards structuring new paradigms. This is the more important contribution made by the doctrine of Syādvāda.